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SUBJECT: Evaluation of Reports on Chinese Communist Presence in Cuba, and Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

1. Our information indicates that there are about 200 Chinese Communist advisers and technicians in Cuba. This figure includes about 50 Chinese directly associated with the Chinese embassy in Havana. A very small number may possibly be military advisers; these might be associated with a group of Cuban pilots who have been trained in China.

2. In addition, there has long been a colony of ethnic Chinese, estimated at about 30,000, resident in Cuba, which has probably given rise to reports of a substantially larger Chinese Communist presence. There appears to have been an effort on the part of the Castro regime to exaggerate the extent of Chinese Communist support and involvement.

3. We have no confirmation that Chinese Communists are teaching Cubans to grow plants producing narcotics, for either medical or illicit purposes. At least 50 Chinese Communists are engaged in agricultural technical assistance, apparently concentrating on rice farming techniques.

4. We have unconfirmed reports that Castro has promised that some of the cash or proceeds of the Bay of Pigs ransom will be passed to revolutionary groups in other Latin American countries, to be used solely for purchase of materiel needed for revolt. This is, in fact plausible, since our reports show that the principal Cuban logistical support for revolutionary groups, other than propaganda materiel, appears to be in the form of cash supplied by Cuban diplomatic missions where they exist, or carried in by courier, to buy whatever arms are available locally or in neighboring countries.

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5. Ships coming from Cuba periodically call at Georgetown, British Guiana to pick up rice, and these ships could offload weapons and ammunition along the coast before reaching port. Neither British Guiana nor Venezuela maintains adequate coastal patrols against such smuggling. Once in port, all Cuban vessels are searched by Guianese under nominal British supervision. So far, the results of these searches have been negative. Cuban policy in general appears to be to avoid shipping arms to subversives abroad on the theory that such groups should be self-sustaining. Exceptions of course could and would be made if any particular situation looked promising from the revolutionary standpoint.

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